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I. INTRODUCTION
Is nature normative? Can we become better people and fashion just soci-
eties based upon principles or laws of nature? What, if anything, from a legal per-
spective is to be learned from observation of an ant colony, a lightning storm or
the movement of clouds?
The question has more than academic interest, as noted in Lloyd
Weinreb's Natural Law and Justice, in which he argues for a return to natural
law's ontological basis.' Tracing its roots in Greek expressions of natural law that
allowed for free will in an otherwise determinate natural order, Weinreb surveys
the history of natural law only to find that what began as ontological became
deontological, which led natural law theories away from nature and reason and
towards a focus on concepts of morality. He argues ultimately that such deonto-
logical theories fail to answer the question of human freedom within a causal uni-
verse in the same way that the original versions of ontological natural law also
* B.A., Drew University; J.D., New York University. Mr. Richman is a Partner in the law
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ary journals throughout the country.
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failed.2 In seeking, however, a return to some ontological basis for natural law as
the preferred way to accommodate antinomic notions of liberty and equality,
desert and entitlement, and freedom and cause, he stresses the role that an under-
standing of nature can provide, particularly since "[i]ncreasing control over nature
by the discovery of its laws increases human freedom in one sense."3
For Weinreb, the human condition is a constant state of striving, but he
views the search for natural law as one that seeks the ideal within the real or, as
becomes apparent from his conclusions, within nature. This is not to say that we
can definitively rationalize conflicting concepts of liberty, equality, justice, enti-
tlement and desert, but that we can accept an imperfect ability to explain these
concepts. We can do so, Weinreb seems to be saying, by reaffirming the value of
inquiry into the laws of nature, or at least familiarity with a concept of communi-
ty and a natural predisposition of a particular community over time to come to an
equilibrium that satisfies its members' notions of a proper reconciliation of these
concepts, which reconciliation allows for self-determination to move within a
loose, if ultimately fixed, determinate background natural order.' In so doing he
sounds themes discernible within the poetry of William Cullen Bryant (1794-
1878), a practicing lawyer and the country's first major poet.
It is no longer necessary to justify the use of literature to approach law, or
vice versa. We live by analogy and metaphor; to the extent that exploration of one
medium yields light upon another, it has value. This article explores Weinreb's
notions from the perspective of a lawyer/poet practicing and writing at a forma-
tive period of both American law and letters, with the argument that Bryant's poet-
ry sets forth an ontological viewpoint of a normative natural order that allows for
the self-determinative exercise of freedom.
Weinreb articulates his journey as an exploration of the dispute between
natural law and legal positivism, and what justice adds to concepts of liberty and
equality, in the context of what he terms "the central fact of the human condition:
human moral responsibility in a causally determinate natural order."5 Similarly,
Bryant engaged in such a search for order. His inspiration was based on personal
immersion in the natural world. His poetry was also in large part political, but
may be read more in contemporary terms as a political morality, a concern with
community. Paradoxically, even within a seemingly rigid force of natural order
Bryant found a freedom that became lost when nature was forgotten.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 264.
4. Id. at 258-59 ("[N]o fully determinate order can satisfy the requirement of justice that
desert be individual . .
5. Id. at vii.
[VOL. 30:4
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This is not to say that Bryant was simply a poet of the woods; it has been
argued elsewhere that he in some ways was apprehensive of the natural world and
moved away from it towards civic duty, but nonetheless paid close attention to
nature's "lessons."6 As a practicing lawyer he often had occasion to compare "nat-
ural" with "human" order. It is that contrast of influence that allows an examina-
tion of Weinreb's themes in Bryant's poetry, and vice versa, again taking up the
principal challenge of law and literature to enable insight into the nature of law
from a variety of angles and interpretative methods.
II. SEEKING THE NORMATIVE NATURAL ORDER
IN HISTORY AND TRADITION
Searching for a normative natural order is not a fool's errand, but rather,
a profound attempt to render meaning from apparently random events in the nat-
ural world and sustain a belief in one's ability to be self-determinative. One does
not look upon terminal illness in a child as a sign of punishment for evil, as
Weinreb points out, but nonetheless "[h]uman beings are apart from nature and a
part of it," and therefore we should regain "the original understanding of natural
law as a theory about the nature of being, the human condition in particular."'
Similarly, in one of his most famous and influential poems, Thanatopsis, Bryant
emphasizes nature as a source of understanding: "To him who in the love of
Nature holds/Communion with her visible forms, she speaks/A various language
.... Go forth, under the open sky, and list/To Nature's teachings, while from all
around/Earth and her waters, and the depths of air/Comes a still voice .... "I
Therefore, in seeking a normative natural order, what is sought in the end
is an awareness of the forces of nature, our place within nature, and a deeper
understanding of how law comports with that interaction. That deeper under-
standing enables us to move from descriptive to prescriptive involvement with
law, and towards a more relevant concept of natural law. It is a sophisticated con-
cept, and Weinreb moves up and down the natural law hill, from the Greeks to
present deontological theories, in pursuing it. Bryant as well moved between cou-
ntry and city, between the world of the woods and that of law, politics and jour-
nalism, in arriving at a similar understanding.
By way of historical background and analysis, Weinreb asserts that earli-
er Greek views of nature were that nature embodied a normative order,9 so that
6. See generally ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE
174-95 (1984).
7. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 7.
8. WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT, THE POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT
21 (Roslyn 2d ed. 1915) [hereinafter POETICAL WORKS]. All of Bryant's poems quoted in this
article are found in and taken from POETICAL WORKS.
9. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 32-42.
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"the ontological aspect of natural law, which becomes its distinctive characteris-
tic, can fairly be described as Platonic."'" Thomas Aquinas shifted the focus and
changed the question from one that asked whether nature was a normative natur-
al order, to one inquiring how human beings can be part of the natural order and
still be morally responsible." Weinreb sums up the Thomistic concept by noting
"[n]atural law, then, is the link between the eternal law in the mind of God and the
moral law for human beings, between nature (providence) and reason .... A just
law is in conformity with reason and nature, hence also natural law, and is bind-
ing in conscience."' 2 "Human freedom [is therefore] consistent with natural
order."'3
With the rise of nation-states, such questions became matters for political,
as opposed to religious, arenas. The remaining issue was resolution of how one
could accept self-determination if a natural order predisposed one's actions.
Weinreb summarizes the theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, in which the
question was not how human beings could be free in a normative natural order,
but rather how they could be free in a society of laws not of their own making. In
essence, the man-made "social contract" took the place of nature for determina-
tion of a normative order.'4 Immanuel Kant was the Rubicon, making natural law
deontological and linking freedom to morality, thereby separated from a phenom-
enal order.'" Natural law therefore became a home for theories of morality and of
justice, disconnected from its roots in nature; the deontological view was that it is
a "mistake" to accept nature as a normative order. It is this last point that Weinreb
rejects, in essence claiming the original connection of natural law theories to
nature was not a mistake, even if that particular historical connection was flawed
in the formulations of the Greeks and the Scholasticists. 6
Comparably, Bryant, as a poet, recognized throughout his verse the
imperative of a connection between nature and morality, nature and community,
nature and law. As a law student, Bryant certainly missed his time outdoors, and
in a very basic way, felt that a separation from nature for pursuit of legal studies
had its negative impact. From his reading of Coke, he wrote:
O'er Coke's black-letter page,
Trimming the lamp at eve, 't is mine to pore,
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1-2; for a general discussion, see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS (Sigmund ed. 1988).
12. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 59-60.
13. Id. at 60.
14. Id. at 67-90.
15. Id. at 90-96.
16. Id. at 96-98.
[VOL. 30:4
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Well pleased to see the venerable sage
Unlock his treasur'd wealth of legal lore;
And I that loved to trace the woods before,
And climb the hill, a play mate of the breeze,
Have vow'd to tune the rural lay no more,
Have bid my useless classics sleep at ease,
And left the race of bards to scribble, starve and freeze. 7
Of more moment and directly relevant to Weinreb's argument is Bryant's
more mature poem The Ages.'8 Emphasizing American tradition and culture, the
poem is an example of legal thinking in Bryant's poetry, and in particular, an argu-
ment for the value of community'9 that emphasizes the normative force of tradi-
tion and acceptance within an extended community."' Exalting Nature ("Look on
this beautiful world, and read the truth/In her fair page"), Bryant traces the histo-
ry of Western civilization.2' Following early chaos,
The weak, against the sons of spoil and wrong,
Banded, and watched their hamlets, and grew strong;
States rose, and, in the shadow of their might,
The timid rested. To the reverent throng,
Grave and time-wrinkled men, with locks all white,
Gave laws, and judged their strifes, and taught the way of right.22
This argument of the dominance of the original strong as part of a natur-
al order, finds parallel in the early Greek formulations of natural law; nothing is
innately more "natural" than the "law of the jungle," to which Bryant alludes. It
17. Letter from William Cullen Bryant to Jacob Porter (April 26, 1813), in I LETTERS OF
WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT 28 (William Cullen Bryant & Thomas G. Voss, eds., 1975) [here-
inafter LETTERS].
18. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 10-20.
19. Weinreb distinguishes between communitarian arguments, which he generally rejects,
and those that find value in community. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 249-59. Communitarian
views that efface the self in view of a greater good are disputed by him, and probably would
be by Bryant, but like Bryant, Weinreb argues for individual responsibility within a communi-
ty and finds a normative value in a community that develops certain traditions and an accept-
ed course of conduct over a period of time; slavery was not such an accepted course in the
United States as witnessed by the intense opposition to it. Id.
20. "Bryant himself in later years did not regard it as his best poetry, but, considering it an
important statement of his credo and his hopes for his country, he placed it first in all his col-
lected volumes .... " CHARLES H. BROWN, WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT 101 (1971).
Put another way in language relevant to the theme of this article: "The basis for the poet's
optimism is the growth of human liberty, made possible by the new natural environment of the
North American continent." ALBERT F MCLEAN, JR., WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT 77 (updat-
ed ed. 1989).
21. The Ages, POLITICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 12.
22. Id. at 14.
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is only when the weak follow a natural impulse and unite to become the strong is
a sense of balance (and law) restored. And this, too, Bryant seems to suggest, is
part of the natural order, a natural evolution that makes secure the force of law
within a stable community. 3
In fact, following the domination of this new strong group, "bolder spir-
its seized the rule" and tyranny resulted, followed by civilizations in Greece and
Rome, until a "ray of brightness from above" with the birth of Christ, and a peri-
od of "saintly rottenness" that was "shielded by priestly power, and watched by
priestly eyes." Ultimately, revolution and the colonization of the New World:
"Europe is given a prey to sterner fates," but America "shalt never fall." Arguably,
Bryant's poem can be read to suggest that Europe was seen as abandoning natur-
al law's basis in nature, and becoming subject to an ordering based on an artificial
government or society. Such views were found in Hobbes, Rousseau or Locke
where a social contract replaced nature as an underpinning of the social order.1
4
Bryant's concept of community emphasizing American tradition and cul-
ture is evident in The Ages. It is also consistent with a Thomistic view of com-
munity; Aquinas, in defining law as "a rule or measure of action by which one is
led to action or restrained from action," wrote that law is directed toward the com-
mon good since "[t]he individual is part of a perfect whole that is the communi-
ty."25 Aquinas, though, invokes God as the ultimate source of law which is dis-
cerned by people through reason.26 On the other hand, the American version of
natural law following independence was man-made, not God-given.27 If that is so,
then the significance of early American natural law is not inconsistent with the
role of community in the natural law formulations of Aquinas, and Bryant's for-
23. It is a point made in Bryant's lecture ON POETRY IN ITS RELATION TO OUR AGE AND
COUNTRY, reprinted in DANIEL G. HOFFMAN, AMERICAN POETRY AND POETICS 269-276
(1962); also found in 1 THE PROSE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT 24-35(Parke
Godwin ed.) (New York, D. Appleton 1884) ("Our people are too much in love with peace and
gain, the state of society is too settled, and the laws too well enforced and respected, to allow
of wild and strange adventures.").
24. Some have suggested that so-called modem natural law, as opposed to medieval nat-
ural law, began with Thomas Hobbes and "tends to be primarily and mainly a series of 'rights,'
of subjective claims originating in the human will." Rauol Berger, Natural Law and Judicial
Review: Reflections of an Earthbound Lawyer, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 5, 11 (1992) quoting LEO
STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES at vii-viii (Elisa M. Sinclair trans.,
1963). John Locke added the notion of "the pursuit of wealth, which would channel hostility
into free economic competition." Id. at 13. Ultimately, the American version of natural law
following independence was man-made, not God-given. Id. at 19.
25. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW QU. 90 THE ESSENCE OF LAW, in
Sigmund supra note 11, at 44.
26. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Interestingly enough, Weinreb concludes
[VOL. 30:4
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mulation-without resort to a divinity, but beginning with nature and the commu-
nity that fits within that natural order, is consistent with such a natural law theo-
ry.
III. COMMUNITY, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
Throughout Bryant's poetry, and implicit in the discussions of natural law,
words are used representing significant concepts that form essential components
of a just society, such as liberty and freedom. In terms of "liberty," Weinreb
asserts that all liberties alter the natural distribution of power, since it confirms
power in some persons while denying it in others."' Nature left to itself is dis-
positive of liberty only as power; it is a matter of individual self-determination to
limit the exercise of individual liberty.' Within communities, though, certain
conventions "are so fully part of the pattern of life that the question of justifica-
tion does not arise; for members of the community, it would be as out of place as
if it were asked about the phenomena of nature."' Such a "natural" understand-
ing suffices to maintain a general concept of liberty.'
Equality can only be understood as a human value in the context of lib-
erty." Once again, as in a natural order, Weinreb notes that "[a] community's set-
tled understandings give content to the ideal of equality .... ,3 Having examined
these concepts, Weinreb concludes that "the effort to solve the problem of free-
dom within a determinate order by transferring it from nature to civil society does
not succeed."' He finds the three concepts are used both prescriptively as well as
descriptively in contemporary usage, which he relates to "efforts in the past to
locate the ideal in the real, to which I have referred as the idea of normative nat-
ural order.""5 Provided the "community is intact," the notions of liberty and equal-
ity, and therefore justice, remain in balance.16
that "[o]ur current preoccupation with individual rights obscures the Founders' concern with
the rights of the community rather than the individual." WEINREB, supra note 1, at 24. This
concept of community permeates Bryant's poetry and seems to be at the core of what Weinreb
is attempting to establish.
28. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 156-57.
29. Id. at 157.
30. Id. at 158.
31. Id. at 157.
32. Id. at 161.
33. WEINREB, supra note I, at 182.
34. Id. at 224.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 232. He notes that "[j]ustice is concerned only with the situation, natural or oth-
erwise, of human beings." Id. at 235. "Every general theory of justice is an effort to provide a
principled basis for the normative boundary between a person and his circumstances . I..." ld
at 237. The idea of justice is both descriptive and normative, with both found within the per-
son himself. Id. at 249.
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In other words, a community formed against a background that is in
essence a normative natural order will have a moral balance; that balance will be
disturbed by the intrusion of "unnatural," or artificial, non-rational policies
imposed. Along these lines, The Rats and Mice, an early and uncollected politi-
cal poem of Bryant's, forms an intriguing parallel to Weinreb's conception of nor-
mative natural order, replete with the antinomic concepts he identified:
Once on a time, as saith our story,
Within a single edifice
A nation flourished in its glory,
Whose citizens were rats and mice.
The politics they prospered under
Passed far and widely for a wonder,
So based were they on reason's laws,
And equal rights of vermin;-
So planned, the general good to cause
And cleanly keep Justitia's ermine.
Community, a normative natural order based on reason, equality, justice-
these form the ideal state governed by a prescriptive, if not descriptive, natural
law. This is comparable to the theme developed by Weinreb when he notes the
importance of a cohesive community to the ability of notions of liberty and equal-
ity, and therefore justice, to remain in balance. 7
In the next two stanzas of the poem, Bryant describes the mice as becom-
ing traders since only they could fit into the crevices that led to the outside world,
and the rats stayed in the cellar where they became statesmen and politicians. The
rest of the poem becomes an allegory of a community that has slavery, and offers
a defense of free of speech. In the opening stanza, though, the balance provided
by a system of natural law is established-before the imposition of the non-natur-
al phenomenon of slavery.
Weinreb would argue that the natural peaceful relation built upon the
mutual respect of the rats and mice for each other, prior to artificial inflammation
of animosity, is part of a natural background with relevance to the present time as
well. As he notes,
A community's conventions accomplish what nature alone-the
causal interactions of human behavior-does not. Within a comm-
unity at any time, conventional understandings will prescribe that
37. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 30:4
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a great deal of conduct is the actor's own business.., they express
pervasive attitudes and habits of thought, grounded in the practices
of everyday life and institutional arrangements too far-reaching to
be questioned seriously without large disruption of the social order.'
He further writes that,
the conventions of community operate at different levels....
Some matters of convention ... are so fully part of the pattern of
life that the question of justification does not arise; for members
of the community, it would be as out of place as if it were asked
about the phenomena of nature. In that way, an absolute right to
liberty, with variable content, is sustained.39
In the poem, the very thing that Weinreb called out of place occurred: the
conventions were questioned and forcibly changed by deliberate provocation.
Weinreb's principal criticism of deontological natural law is that the argu-
ment by those who attempt to use a concept of natural law to resolve the problem
of freedom by transferring the determinate order from nature to civil society sim-
ply does not succeed.' Bryant makes the point another way by condemning a
determinate civil society that perverts (or even simply ignores) nature. Weinreb
says of slavery and racial discrimination that "[t]hey were all too obviously not
natural phenomena; they had been established and practiced deliberately."', So
Bryant in The Death of Slavery, writes: "Within that land wert thou enthroned of
late,/And they by whom the nation's laws were made,/And they who filled its
judgment-seats obeyed/Thy mandate, rigid as the will of Fate."42 The poem takes
on a bitter tone:
Fierce men at thy right hand,
With gesture of command,
Gave forth the word that none might dare gainsay
And grave and reverend ones, who loved thee not,
Shrank from thy presence, and in blank dismay
Choked down, unuttered, the rebellious thought;
While meaner cowards, mingling with thy train,
Proved, from the book of God, thy right to reign. 3
38. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 138-39.
39. Id. at 158.
40. Id. at 224.
41. ld. at 232.
42. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 317-19.
43. Id. at 318.
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Bryant's bitter attack on those who would distort natural law (which was
based on "natural" tolerance for people and condemnation of slavery) by resort-
ing to "the book of God" and an artificial strength supports Weinreb's arguments
relating to the non-natural phenomena that infect an otherwise just society.
Comparably, in The African Chief, Bryant vividly contrasts the nobility of
an enslaved African chief with the hypocrisy of Christian charity in this country:
"[c]hained in the market-place he stood,/A man of giant frame,/Amid the gather-
ing multitude/That shrunk to hear his name."" He continues: "Vainly, but well that
chief had fought,/He was a captive now,/Yet pride, that fortune humbles not,fWas
written on his brow."45 The chief offers ransom money, and the response is "'Not
for thy ivory nor thy gold/Will I unbind thy chain;/That bloody hand shall never
hold/The battle-spear again./A price that nation never gave/Shall yet be paid for
thee;/For thou shalt be the Christian's slaveIn lands beyond the sea."' 6 Pleading
to be released to be back with his family, he gives up his gold, which is taken
(although he remains shackled) and he ultimately goes mad.47 The madness of the
African chief is not "natural." Such a practice destroys community and interferes
with natural concepts of equality and justice.
Numerous of Bryant's poems deal with condemnation of slavery, a dis-
tinct theme of natural law." Despite a recognition of the reality of human conduct,
Bryant still believed in a kind of natural law influence; "[s]omehow-all violence,
tyranny, greed, and corruption notwithstanding-human society could share with
natural processes the propensity to renew itself and to bring forth fresh, beautiful
forms of life."49 As in Rats and Mice, community was important to Bryant
because it provided balance; it was when "reason's laws" were abandoned and
influences outside the community (the investigating cat) were brought in that the
balance was destroyed. As Weinreb notes, "[w]hile a community is intactat all,
44. Id. at 101.
45. Id. at 102.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 103. Notes to the POETICAL WORKS indicate the source for the story to be found
in the African Repository for April 1825; "the subject of it was a warrior of majestic stature,
the brother of Yarradee, king of the Solima nation. He had been taken in battle, and was
brought in chains for sale to the Rio Pongas, where he was exhibited in the market-place, his
ankles still adorned with massy rings of gold which he wore when captured. The refusal of his
captors to listen to his offers of ransom drove him mad, and he died a maniac." POETICAL
WORKS, supra note 8, at 407-08.
48. "Nearly one-fifth of the poems composed by William Cullen Bryant make reference, if
only in passing, to political ideas or events.... When considered in the light of Bryant's career
and personal inclinations, the themes of the political verse are predictable: freedom, the rights
of mankind, the nobility of the human spirit, human progress." MCLEAN, supra note 20, at 68.
49. Id. at 68-69.
[VOL. 30:4
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the ideas of liberty and equality will have some reasonably definite, uncon-
troversial normative content, which has an objective basis in the community's way
of life.""0 The greater the number in the community and the more established the
common understandings, the more accepted (and normative) the "laws" will be.
Bryant, in The Better Age, finds comparable force in community:
Thus in the works of mercy that engage
The minds and hands of thousands, we behold
Signs of a blessed future. They who watch
Beside the sick-beds of the poor, who seek
And lead the erring back to the right way ....
Within the community, though, force is required in some capacity, just as
in the natural world force reacts against force to produce an equilibrium. The
"law of the jungle" is nothing more than a necessity for the maintenance of liber-
ty for all involved. (This calls to mind Kipling's apt lines: "Now this is the Law
of the Jungle as old and as true as the sky;/And the Wolf that shall keep it may
prosper, but the Wolf that shall break it must die.""). Put another way by Weinreb,
"[l]iberty, then, depends on the equality constricted by a restriction of liberty."'.3
Liberty and equality are mutually dependent and mutually opposed; with limited
resources in a society and naturally disproportionate distribution of talent and
ability, some degree of force is necessary to overcome a "survival of the fittest"
natural order.- This is not counterintuitive; for the strong to protect the weak is
also a "natural" outgrowth and part of the natural order, to the extent that reason
is natural and provides the basis for self-determination within that natural order.
Not just liberty, but its antinomy, equality, is also a function of
community:
A community's settled understandings give content to the ideal of
equality .... As in the case of liberty, the result may be that
what is only 'very natural' to the members of a community
acquires an aspect of inevitable rightness that makes it seem
'natural' in another sense. The community's conventions support
principles of equality and are in turn supported by them."
50. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 232.
51. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 377.
52. RADYARD KIPLING, THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE, in THE SECOND JUNGLE BOOK 29
(New York, The Century Co. 1895).
53. WEINREB, supra note I, at 225.
54. Id. at 226.
55. Id. at 182.
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The value of such lessons relating to nature and natural law are present in
William Tell, a poem about the Swiss hero who "while thy prison-walls were dark
around,/Didst meditate the lesson Nature taught,/And to thy brief captivity was
brought/A vision of thy Switzerland unbound." Nature provides the background
normative order: mountains "proclaim/The everlasting creed of liberty."56
The parallel is striking. For Weinreb, there is an ineluctability to nature
that establishes a right to liberty regardless of the particular community. Over
time, a perception within the community can shift and become established as
defining the baselines for liberty and convention; he cites the shift from smoking
to non-smoking as the example in current American society. 7 In an extreme sit-
uation, non-natural phenomena may be imposed, but they cannot last against the
stronger currents of tradition and acceptance of "natural" conditions within com-
munity. Comparably, for Bryant, nature imposes and is a symbol for liberty, in
the form of mountains in the background. Like societal conventions of Weinreb,
they are vast, pervasive, near-permanent, formed over time. And while other less
fundamental forces may come and go, the mountains, like Weinreb's background
normative order, persist.
In Weinreb's arguments against facile formulations of liberty and equali-
ty, he raises questions as to the limits of understanding, but in the end reverts to
"nature," or the force of community traditions in itself a natural product, for a
finding of stability and resolution of the parameters of free will within a natural
order. In a "natural moral order" in which all get what they deserve, there can be
no self-determined action." To resolve this one could argue that a normative nat-
ural order allows everyone to get what they deserve. 9 In the end, the "starting
point" is "freedom, our awareness of ourselves and others as self-determining,
morally responsible persons, acting consequentially within a causally determinate
natural order.""'
This "causally determinate natural order" is not to be taken literally, as in
the manner of the ancient Greek notion of god-determined fate. Rather, it forms
a kind of challenge, a broad harness in which law may move smoothly:
56. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 118.
57. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 139-40.
58. Id. at 221.
59. Id. at 222. Weinreb suggests that this is the solution offered by Robert Nozick in
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1994). Id. At the other extreme he posits John Rawls' A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), which rejects desert in favor of universal entitlement. Id. at 222-
23.
60. WEINREB, supra note I, at 223.
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Increasing control over nature by the discovery of its laws incr-
eases human freedom in one sense. We are freed from subjection
to unalterable conditions of existence and can reshape them to
approximate more closely a concrete idea of justice. The "accidents"
of our lives, whether they are unforeseen calamities and strokes of
fortune or simply the arbitrary distribution of endowments, can more
nearly be corrected. Entitlement, determined by human law,
encroaches on nature, and we are able to establish a just background
order where it had previously to be assumed. From another point of
view, human freedom is not increased. Once we have reduced phe-
nomena to order and learned the causes that make their occurrence
determinate, no room is left for desert.6'
Bryant recognizes this. In The Antiquity of Freedom, freedom is not "as
poets dream" a "fair young girl" with "wavy tresses gushing from the cap/With
which the Roman master crowned his slave" but rather, "[a] bearded man,/Armed
to the teeth," and "one mailed hand/Grasps the broad shield, and one the sword.
62
The metaphor for freedom is one of supreme strength, veteran of "old wars" and
whose "massive limbs are strong with struggling." Significantly, though, this
image of freedom is not a function of "human hands," but rather, its birthright is
such that freedom was "twin-born with man."63 Freedom sat side by side with
"Man" in nature, made ready to avoid the snares of Tyranny, another metaphori-
cal image. In other words, as Weinreb suggests, "[w]hen a community defines the
liberties of its members, by inclusion or exclusion, it confronts the antinomic con-
ditions of complete justice not as a philosophic problem but as an intensely prac-
tical one ... unless (contrary to Hobbes) we assume that nature is normatively
ordered, it is liberty without responsibility or freedom, because there can be no
desert."'
IV. BRYANT, WEINREB AND THE IDEALVERSUS THE REAL
We are part of nature and act accordingly; on some level, this must be rec-
ognized. By mastering nature, or at least the awareness of our place in it, we can
help define the community we create and our conceptions of freedom. This
notion is reflected clearly in Bryant's nature poetry, in which he, too, begins with
a background of nature and derives its relevance to his own search of order.
61. Id. at 264-65.
62. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 199.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 230.
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For Bryant, "The ground of the moral sentiment lay not in man but in
Nature-Nature apart from man. In the end, poems about Nature were lessons
learned, not experiences lived through. The teacher was God; and the poet went
to this greatest of teachers in His classroom of Nature so that he himself could
become a teacher."65 The poem that clearly shows this is A Forest Hymn.
In A Forest Hymn, a solemn poem about the grandeur of the trees, the real
sanctuary of God (as opposed to the man-made buildings) Bryant concludes with
"Be it ours to meditateIn these calm shades, thy milder majesty,/And to the beau-
tiful order of thy works/Learn to conform the order of our lives."' Similarly, in
Inscription for the Entrance to a Wood,67 the "haunts of Nature" in the forest are
the antidote for the "haunts of men." Rain and the power of nature is contrasted
with "Fraud, the coward" and "Strength, the ruffian" that are part of commerce, in
A Rain-Dream. As man-made "strifes" oppress one, inspiration is found in watch-
ing the power of the natural force, rain, that stops birds from flying and beasts
from walking the field. The poem begins with a disdainful reference to fraud that
"tracks his prey by stealth" and contrasts the more open and honest, and natural,
rain .68
Another example is Noon, an unfinished poem, in which Bryant admon-
ishes people: "[a]mid the overflow of day,/Behold the power which wields and
cherishes/The frame of Nature."'69 Yet despite the silence of nature, "All the
while/A ceaseless murmur from the populous town/Swells o'er these solitudes..
. ." "Noon, in that mighty mart of nations, brings/No pause to toil and care." And
finally, "Thus, in this feverish time, when love of gain/And luxury possess the
hearts of men,/Thus is it with the noon of human life."'7
It is consistent with the arguments put forward to interpret such poetry
against the backdrop of natural law as understood by lawyers of the time. Bryant
learned law as a clerk to Samuel Howe and Congressman William Baylies from
1811 through 1814,11 and matured into a practicing lawyer at a time when natural
law was an integral part of the American legal psyche. 2 For example, in the con-
text of the formulation of law in post-revolutionary America, Cicero remained rel-
65. ROY HARVEY PEARCE, THE CONTINUITY OF AMERICAN POETRY 207 (1961)
66. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 82.
67. Id. at 24-25.
68. Id. at 226.
69. Id. at 205.
70. Id. at 206.
71. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 178.
72. See, e.g.,. Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1037-39 (1994). See also ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION
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evant." There were those who found direct expression of a natural law philoso-
phy in political discourse based upon natural phenomena themselves, which was
an attractive viewpoint to the extent that order was the goal of Jefferson and oth-
ers who were impressed by and recorded the natural occurrences within the new
country.74 The Constitution established "nexus between natural law and the man-
made or positive law."7 To the extent that "Jefferson claims that the Declaration
of Independence was based on the common sense of the ancients and moderns
that provided a harmonizing sentiment, it is clear that natural law philosophy is at
the very core of this common sense," with the overriding commonality through-
out the ages being "that human nature is, in significant respects, determinate,
unchanging and structured."76
Coke and Blackstone were the leading authorities studied, and it is evi-
dent from his writings, such as the one quoted above, that Bryant was exposed to
them. Blackstone described a jurisprudential system in terms of nature, no less
than likening it to the universe, with interconnected subordinate systems.7 7 Coke's
views on "natural law" are complex and subject to differing interpretations;7" it is
significant here to note simply that Coke was read in a context of "natural law,"
whatever that meant, and that Bryant must have formed views as to Coke himself,
even if subconsciously. Berman argues that while Coke's view that "reason is the
life of the law" would be consistent with St. Thomas Aquinas, and that Coke in a
way supplanted natural law with a faith in historical, traditional and common law
notions that embodied and superseded natural law in its Medieval incarnations 9
From a poetic standpoint as well, nature was a prime influence. Before
To THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 19-21 (Rev. ed. 1954)
73. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 76.
74. Id. at 46-47.
75. Id. at 62.
76. Robert P George, Natural Law and Civil Rights: From Jefferson's 'Letter to Henry
Lee' to Martin Luther King's "Letter from Birmingham Jail," The 1993 St. Ives Lecture before
the Columbus School of Law (Apr. 21, 1993) in 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 143, 147-153 (1993).
77. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 32.
78. Coke wrote "[t]he law of nature is that which God at the time of creation of man infused
into his heart," WEINREB, supra note i, at 7; in this view, Weinreb notes that Coke viewed the
law as "a work of reason in this sense, that it is the nature of law to be reasonable; and that the
test of its reasonableness, he thinks, is its ability to withstand the test of time." Id. Others sug-
gest a less "natural law" orientation to Coke, or limit him to a kind of natural law philosophy
that simply asserts the role of common law and reason as opposed to strict positivism as com-
ing from the monarch. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE
10-11 (1994); CARL J. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
77-83 (2d ed. 1963)("The natural law viewpoint of the King, which is also represented by
Bacon, is clearly opposed to Coke's view.").
79. Harnold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103
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Bryant, the politically charged poet Philip Freneau had made extensive use of
nature in his poetry, as part of the naturalism influence in late eighteenth century
poetry.' Freneau presumed a natural order that was reflected in political action.
He is a prelude to Bryant, part of the cultural context in which Bryant wrote,
although Bryant himself apparently had little respect for, nor was he influenced
by, Freneau.8'
At the core of his argument, Weinreb asserts that whether or not others
recognize a person's rights in reality, those rights are there and discernible, and
each person has responsibility within a normative natural order.82 Bryant's poetry
emphasizes that. Poems such as The African Chief reaffirm the basic rights pre-
sent with each person, regardless of the current or contemporaneous society's
reaction. Those rights are ontological; they flow from an affinity with nature and
a need to be in and a part of nature. Bryant's background of nature is normative.
It is instructive. When people forsake nature, and forsake their natural (and nor-
mative) communities, an amoral order results. Nature provides a perspective
which itself causes people to act a certain way; as in Bryant's The Mystery of
Flowers, where each flower "has her moral rede," it is clear that "The faintest
streak that on a petal lies/ May speak instruction to initiate eyes."83
This has been argued recently in terms of the Declaration of
Independence, which "preserves the existential reference of constitutional con-
cepts, gives it a certain content and valence by directing our attention to 'nature.
' ' 4
YALE L. J. 1651, 1689-1693 (1994).
80. HARRY HAYDEN CLARK, INTRODUCTION TO POEMS OF FRENEAU xlvii-lviii (Harry
Hayden Clark ed., 1960). See in particular Freneau's poem Reflections on the Constitution, or
Frame of Nature, in which he writes "Here beauty, order, power behold/Exact, all perfect,
uncontrouled [sic]; /All in its proper place arranged, /Immortal, endless, and unchanged." Id.
at 414-15. In the Citizen's Resolve, he contrasts the permanence of trees. Id. at 226. See also
On the Universality and Other A tributes of the God of Nature, Id. at 422., On The Uniformity
and Perfection of nature, Id. at 423, and On the religion of nature. Id. at 424, as other exam-
ples of Freneau's poetry in this regard.
81. BROWN, supra note 20, at 83-84. Brown notes that "Bryant seems not to have known
Freneau's nature poems, which made him a predecessor of Bryant himself in writing about the
American countryside," id., yet Van Wyck Brooks asserts that Bryant "must have encountered
Philip Freneau in the circle of Gulian Verplanck" in New York. VAN WYCK BROOKS, THE
WORLD OF WASHINGTON IRVING 252 (1944). See also JOHN BIGELOW, WILLIAM CULLEN
BRYANT 46 (Boston & New York, Houghton Mifflin 1890) (Freneau's "occasional produc-
tions, distinguished by a coarse strength of sarcasm and abounding with allusions to passing
events, which are perhaps their greatest merit.").
82. See also LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND RIGHTS, IN NATURAL LAW
THEORY 278-305 (Robert P. George, ed., 1994).
83. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 396.
84. Ronald R. Garet, The Resolution of Independence, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 867, 870 (1992).
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The "twin intuitions" of such an appeal is in terms of each person having a nature
which yields certain rights, and living in nature which yields certain laws."5 The
Greek gods were part of a determinative background order, and Aquinas refer-
ences the Judeo-Christian God as the divine providence that establishes eternal
law, which is discerned by reason and is directed toward the common good.
Weinreb does not resort to a theological basis, and this suggests a further affinity
with Bryant.
Bryant's poem The Conjunction of Jupiter and Venus is particularly inter-
esting in this regard. Among other things, it demonstrates the ambivalence Bryant
seemed to feel towards organized religion, and his own abiding faith in a person-
al, almost pantheistic, approach.86 Beginning with the statement "I would not
always reason. The straight path/Wearies us with the never-varying lines,/And we
grow melancholy," Bryant contrasts (and personifies Reason) and calls "her" his
"counsellor,/But not my tyrant," noting "the spirit needs/Impulses from a deeper
source than hers,/And there are motions, in the mind of man,/That she must look
upon with awe."87 While he bows to her, he is also mindful of "the fair illusions
of old time /Illusions that shed brightness over life,/And glory over Nature." At
the time of the meeting of Jupiter and Venus, he notes a time of peace; a fruitful
autumn follows a year of drought. These "[e]mblems of power and beauty ...
Shine brightest on our borders, and withdraw/Toward the great Pacific, marking
out/The path of empire." Having "tamed" the native tribes, the people are happy
and "wear softer hearts,/And shudder at the butcheries of war,/As now at other
murders." ' The poem concludes with a reference to Greece and hope for its
future.89
Even if not attributable to a particular religion, "in a sense, all of Bryant's
poems of nature are traceable to a concern for religious values."' One might
almost call a belief in ontological natural law "religious" in that sense, namely,
that there is something beyond our present comprehension.9' To the extent that
ontological natural law depends upon order, and the Aquinistic or Greek view was
that God or gods supplied that order, Bryant's poetry contains this thread.
Bryant's New England was a world of an increasing liberalism and deterioration
85. Id. at 872-73.
86. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 111-13. "Bryant, as most of his poetry testifies,
found this deeper source [expressed in Conjunction] in nature and in his conception of the past,
the present, and the future as constituting a process that, though set in motion by the Creator,
was in a constant state of renewal." BROWN, supra note 20, at 397-98.
87. Conjunction, POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 111.
88. Id. at 112.
89. Id. at 113.
90. MCLEAN, supra note 20, at 39.
91. Compare ST. ANSELM, Proslogion, Chapter 2 God Truly is: "Without doubt, therefore,
there exists, both in the understanding and in the reality, something than which a greater can-
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of strict Calvinistic predestination; "the liberal consciousness, its initial awe of a
Newtonian machine-universe rubbed thin, turned to an image of the Creator with
which the heart might make contact, a beneficent Father whose construction of
the natural order, according to the revealed laws of physics, was accompanied by
generous goodwill toward men.
92
Bryant's poem The Earth is Full of Thy Riches has been cited as an exam-
ple of this attitude, although Bryant is distinguished from Freneau "not because
he rejects natural philosophy, but because his lyricism travels farther down the
road of personal involvement with the facts of nature."93 Bryant has been inter-
preted as viewing poetry not purely as entertainment but as imparting wisdom; he
embodied a moralism within his poems? 4 He "was convinced that a genuinely
American poetry might minister to the moral needs of its readers, guiding them
and their institutions in the paths of democratic righteousness. '" 9
Although it has been asserted in some quarters that Bryant never "articu-
lated" his beliefs in a systematic way and provided only a philosophical "frame-
work," ' such an interpretation did not attempt to place Bryant's poetry in the con-
text of natural law theory or discuss it in terms of Bryant's own legal training and
practice. That training would have been marked by an acceptance of the impor-
tance of common as opposed to statutory law as a dynamic part of effectuation of
social change and as an "instrument of policy," 97 For example, in commenting on
the risks inherent in judges interpreting statutes, John Adams made an observation
of some relevance here, finding that such judicial interpretation with the result
that "one Construction or Consequence is piled up upon another until we get an
immense distance from Fact, Truth and Nature.
98
Consequently, Bryant was more than likely keenly aware of what
Weinreb has discussed in terms of kosmos and physic, and may even be seen to
not be thought," quoted in THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 26 (John Hick, ed. 1964).
92. MCLEAN, supra note 20, at 40.
93. Id. at 40-41.
94. BROWN, supra note 20, at 145. Brown further notes "Bryant's constant drawing upon
nature in his own poetry to find illustrations for moral ideas." Id. See also PEARCE, supra
note 65, at 206, quoting Bryant's second Lectures on Poetry: "Among the most remarkable of
the influences of poetry is the exhibition of those analogies and correspondences which it
behold between the things of the moral and of the natural world. I refer to its adorning and
illustrating each by the other-infusing a moral sentiment into natural objects, and bringing
images of visible beauty and majesty to heighten the effect of moral sentiment."
95. PEARCE, supra note 65, at 206.
96. MCLEAN, supra note 20, at 42-43.
97. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 1-3
(1977).
98. Id. at 5 (emphasis added), quoting from and citing John Adams, Case No. 46, in 2
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 199 (L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds. 1965).
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implicitly reject the same determinate natural orders in favor of a view compara-
ble to Weinreb, that is, as one of instruction and balance. This is not to say that
Bryant deliberately set out to formulate a jurisprudential philosophy in his poet-
ry. It is merely to suggest that the influence of legal training and practice com-
bined with and manifested itself within his poetry, and it is possible to argue a
comparable (if not prescient) position to that espoused by Weinreb.
Bryant knew the realities of legal practice. When he began, though, he
tired of the provincial, backwater practice among "bigoted" persons in his first
place of practice, Plainfield, and left for Great Barrington.9 Within a year he
expressed regret to his father that he did not go to Boston to practice in the initial
instance; he did "not relish this business of skulking about in holes and comers of
the earth."'' It is not surprising, therefore, that poetry remained a paramount
interest over law; in 1817 he answered his mentor Baylies' question as to whether
he was pleased with his profession by writing "the Muse was my first love and the
remains of that passion which not rooted out yet chilled into extinction will
always I fear cause me to look coldly on the severe beauties of Themis."''1
In 1821 he had written that he was "one who does not follow the study of
law very eagerly, because he likes other studies better; and yet devotes little of his
time to them, for fear that they should give him a dislike to law."' ° He was there-
fore no stranger to the "real world" of practice, and was described as "an active,
learned, and rather fiery young lawyer" with a more than average number of
reported decisions for the time for one his age.'0 3 He once referred to his profes-
sion as "a shabby business."' 4 This abhorrence of the rough and tumble side of
law, or at least legal practice, may have found expression in his poetry through his
idealization of nature. It was certainly at least one contemporaneous view that
though he "was not particularly distinguished as a lawyer, but might have become
so could he have overcome his disgust with a profession in whicheven then more
99. Letter From William Cullen Bryant To An Unidentified Friend (Dec. 1816), in
LETTERS, supra note 17, at 64.
100. Letter From William Cullen Bryant To His Father Peter Bryant (Jan. 10, 1818), in
LETTERS, supra note 17, at 77-78.
101. Letter From William Cullen Bryant to William Baylies (May 27, 1817), in LETTERS,
supra note 17, at 71. Themis was the goddess of law and justice, daughter of Uranus and Gaea,
represented by holding the scale for weighing opposing claims.
102. Letter From William Cullen Bryant to Edward Channing (June 2, 1821), in LETTERS,
supra note 17, at 105.
103. BIGELOW, supra note 81, at 38 n. 1, quoting from an obituary of Bryant appearing in
the BERKSHIRE EAGLE (June 20, 1878).
104. Letter From William Cullen Bryant to Richard Dank (Mar. 30, 1825), in LETTERS,
supra note 17, at 177. This letter was written the same year he wrote The African Chief and A
Forest Hymn, discussed in this article, and sheds light on his view of law that seemingly tol-
erated the shameful circumstances of The African Chief and that ignored the lessons of nature
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than at present [1878]-law was not synonymous with justice."'' 5 On the other
hand, it has been argued that Bryant's poetry was better during his career as a
lawyer than during his career as a journalist, the former having provided an appro-
priate creative tension.'06
The prescriptive and descriptive nature of justice that Weinreb claims to
be found within each person form the threads of Bryant's poetry, which has been
read as a search for order.0 7 Just as Weinreb views the deontological approaches
of natural law as abandonment of what it originally had to teach, so Bryant may
be read as supporting the proposition that there is a methodology to be learned
from a discourse with nature.
V. BRYANT, WEINREB AND THE ORDER OF NATURE
The point becomes more complex when actual prescriptive formulae are
sought, even if they ultimately are unascertainable. Weinreb argues that liberty
without a normative background of justice is unacceptable, and equality must be
related to liberty. Without an independent basis to decide which qualities to pro-
tect, all will fend for themselves at the expense of others. It is the community and
long practice that has yielded a normative content. Nature "expresses its prefer-
ences authoritatively, in its own laws, or not at all."'08 In other words, it is not a
mechanical application of "nature" to the extent that what is, must be because it
is, and if it is, it is naturally so; normative content is found in the community
members' conception as being self-determinative within a just social order. And
the principles of liberty and equality are the governing principles that form the
boundaries once we are removed from the "state of nature."'"1° Justice itself
becomes an "intervention" in the natural order, and depends upon the exercise of
freedom; "unless justice is reduced to mere chance, it appears to follow that the
exercise of freedom must be according to justice.""' And that freedom is a
"determinate order, determined normatively," with justice an attempt to draw
boundaries between a person and his surroundings."' Ultimately, since "[h]uman
life as we know it is possible only in community; the contribution of nature are
inseparable from the effects of some form of nuture." "2
present in A Forest Hymn. See supra note 31 and acompanying text.
105. BIGELOW, supra note 81, at 38 n.1.
106. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 173-78. See also Robert A. Ferguson, William Cullen
Bryant: The Creative Context of the Poet, 53 NEW ENG. Q., 431-63 (1980).
107. FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 175.
108. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 230.
109. Id. at 234.
110. Id. at 234-35.
111. Id. at 235-38.
112. Id. at 241.
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Justice is therefore the "larger idea," and the notion of a normative back-
ground against which all receive their deserts "all the way down," regardless of
their self-determinative acts, brings the notion of a normative natural order "to its
narrowest focus," meaning that the kosmos, or order, is within each individual."3
Bryant comes to Weinreb's aid in The Order of Nature, in which Bryant
trans-lates a poem by the Roman philosopher Boethius."4 In so doing, he devel-
ops a clear argument in favor of ontological natural law that strikes a responsive
chord in Weinreb's conclusions as to the place of justice in a natural order.
Weinreb argues that if desert were no longer applicable, then freedom would van-
ish. As traditional values of a community shift, or as "a slowly accumulating shift
in the fundamental conceptual system by which facts are ordered," then just as
original sin and fate no longer explain our own experience, so desert and freedom
would not be necessary."5 The poem itself likewise suggests a fundamental shift
of value towards a recognition of love and a divinely-inspired natural order, as
contrasted with the starkly political environment in which Boethius was figura-
tively and literally imprisoned.
To the extent that Bryant, trained as a lawyer, was reading Boethius's The
Consolation of Philosophy,"6 and writing this poem in 1866, the year after the
American Civil War and the assassination of Lincoln, the poem provides a means
of evaluating the confluence of legal and literary influence that presages modem
themes. The views find sympathy within Weinreb's analysis that "the issue... is
meaningful freedom within a morally indifferent universe.""
Boethius wrote Consolations in prison and stylistically combined
Platonic dialog and poetry to explore his way back to God. Of relevance here is
Book IV, Poem 6, which Bryant translated. Book IV itself has been read to form
a synthesis of two antinomic ideas comparable to the approach taken by Weinreb.
Boethius unites "the idea of a mutable Fate governing and revolving all things ...
[and the idea] of God as the 'still point of the turning world ... ."'" One might
almost say self-determination and a normative natural order, using Weinreb's
terms. Watts identifies Philosophy, who lectures to Boethius, as setting forth in
113. Id. at 249.
114. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 329-30.
115. Id. at 265.
116. ANCIUS BOETHIUS, THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY (Betty Radice ed. & transl.
V.E. Watts Trans., Penguin Classics ed., 1969) [hereinafter CONSOLATION].
117. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 265.
118. VE. Watts, Introduction to Consolation, supra note 116, at 24.
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this poem a "cosmic power of love" that integrates with human affairs and func-
tions in "concord" with the natural elements." 9
Just before the poem, Philosophy tells Boethius that "God orders all
things and directs them towards goodness." Interestingly Bryant translates in a
vein more akin to Weinreb (and the more classic translation of H.F. Stewart and
E.K. Rand) 120 with a de-emphasis on God and a shift to a less defined natural
order:
Thou who wouldst read, with an undarkened eye,
The laws by which the Thunderer bears sway,'
Look at the stars that keep, in yonder sky,
Unbroken peace from Nature's earliest day.'2'
On the other hand, Watts translates Boethius' opening lines as directly a
function of God:
If you desire to see and understand
In purity of mind the laws of God,
Your sight must on the highest point of heaven rest
Where through the lawful covenant of things
The wandering stars preserve their ancient peace.'22
Bryant translates consistently with his own view that reaches back to
Thanatopsis and the "language" of nature and its instructive power. He uses the
word "read" instead of "see and understand;" he refers initially to the "Thunderer"
rather than God. Indeed, Watts' version (which makes no attempt to rhyme and
strives to be a more literal one) refers to the laws of God, that is, God-made, as
opposed to Bryant's reference to laws that are used (or even govern) the
Thunderer.
Geoffrey Chaucer, translating in the English of his day and closer in time,
combines the two: "Yif thou, wys, wilt demen in thi pure thought the ryghtes or
the lawes of the heye thondrere (that is to seyn, of God), loke thou and byhoold
119. Id. at 25.
120. ANCIUS BOETHIUS, THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES AND CONSOLATION OF
PHILOSOPHY OF BOETHIUS (H.F. Stewart and E.K. Rand Trans., 1918) (Loeb Classical
Library ed. 1962). This version uses the word "thunderer" as well.
121. WILLIAM CULLER BRYANT, THE ORDER OF NATURE, in POETICAL WORKS; supra
note 8 at 329.
122. ANCIUs BOETHIUS, Book IV Poem 6, in CONSOLATION, supra note 116, at 141.
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the heightes of the sovereyn hevene. Ther kepin the sterres, by ryghtful alliaunce
of thinges, hir oolde pees.'"1
Bryant celebrates "the elemental harmony" of nature:
The elemental harmony brings forth
And rears all life, and, when life's term is o'er,
It sweeps the breathing myriads from the earth,
And whelms and hides them to be seen no more:
While the Great Founder, he who gave these laws,
Holds the firm reins and sits amid his skies
Monarch and Master, Origin and Cause,
And Arbiter supremely just and wise.'24
Compare Watts, following up the lines relating to the seasons:
This mixture brings to birth and nourishes
All things which breathe the breath of life on earth;
This mixture seizes, hides, and bears away
All things submerged in death's finality.
Meanwhile there sits on high the Lord of things,
Who rules and guides the reins of all that's made,
Their king and lord, their fount and origin,
Their law and judge of what is right and due.'2
Chaucer's view:
This atempraunce norysscheth and bryngeth forth alle thinges
that brethith lif in this world; and thilke same attempraunce,
ravysschynge, hideth and bynymeth, and drencheth undir the
laste deth, alle thinges iborn.
Among thise thinges sitteth the heye makere, kyng and lord,
welle and bygynnynge, lawe and wys juge to don equite,
and governeth and enclyneth the brydles of thinges 
26
123. GEOFFREX CHAUCER, BOECE, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF CHAUCER, 373, 433
(FN. Robinson, ed. 1933).
124. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 330.
125. CONSOLATION, supra note 116, at 142.
126. CHAUCER, supra note 123, at 433.
19971
23
Richman: William Cullen Bryant
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1997
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Bryant references the various seasons as the elemental harmony. In other
words, for him there is a normative background, a natural order: it is elemental
and it is in harmony. The other translations use less editorial words, such as Watts'
use of mixture.
The final two stanzas by Bryant:
He guides the force he gave; his hand restrains
And curbs it to the circle it must trace:
Else the fair fabric which his power sustains
Would fall to fragments in the void of space.
Love binds the parts together, gladly still
They court the kind restraint nor would be free;
Unless Love held them subject to the Will
That gave them being, they would cease to be.'27
Watts:
All things that he with motion stirs to go
He holds and when they wander brings them back;
Unless He call them home to their true path,
And force them back their orbits to perfect,
Those things which stable order now protects,
Divorced from their true source would fall apart.
This is the love of which all things partake,
The end of good their chosen goal and close:
No other way can they expect to last,
Unless with love for love repaid they turn
And seek again the cause that gave them birth.'28
Chaucer:
And tho thinges that he stirethy to gon by moevynge, he
with draweth and aresteth, and affermeth the moevable or
wandrynge thinges. For yif that he ne clepide nat ayein
the ryght goynge of thinges, and yif that he ne constreynede
hem nat eftsones into roundnesses enclyned, the thingis
that ben now contynued by stable ordenaunce, their
scholden departen from hir welle (that is to seyn, from
127. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 330.
128. CONSOLATION, supra note 116, at 142.
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hir bygynnynge), and failen (that is to seyn, tornen into
noght). This is the comune love to alle thingis, and alle
thinges axen to ben holden by the fyn of good. For
elles ne myghten they nat lasten yif thei ne comen nat
eftsones ayein, by love retorned, to the cause that hath ye
ven hem beinge (that is to seyn, to God).'2"
McLean says of this poem and Bryant's translation that "in spite of his
loss of personal contact with nature, [Bryant] could still speak boldly and mili-
tantly of the harmony and order of natural law."'" (In both Watts' and Chaucer's
translations of Consolations there is no title for the particular poem, but Bryant
not only supplies one (The Order of Nature), but one that is directly expressive of
themes developed in A Forest Hymn and Conjunction of Jupiter and Venus. Given
the numerousness of poems in Consolation, it is also telling that Bryant chose this
one to translate.)
Boethius is concerned in Book IV, where the poem appears, with good
and evil. He argues that freedom is essential to the wicked-if freedom is removed,
it is like relieving criminals of punishment. One of the points made just prior to
the appearance of the poem is that when men are evil, and other evil men who suf-
fer injustice at their hands, they themselves will reform. If God allows evil, it is
because of the assurance that good will form to balance it and eliminate it. In
other words, the natural balance will be restored; as Boethius writes, "For a cer-
tain order embraces all things, and anything which departs from the order planned
and assigned to it, only falls back into order, albeit a different order, so as not to
allow anything to chance in the realm of Providence."' 3 ' We can compare this to
the closing lines of another of Bryant's more famous poems, To A Waterfowl:
He who, from zone to zone,
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone,
Will lead my steps aright."2
In his translation of Boethius, Bryant found a topic within the mainstream
of his thought developed throughout his original poetry. His version (as com-
pared to that of another contemporary translator, Watts) resonates the themes of
Weinreb as well in terms of a background normative order against which self-
129. CHAUCER, supra note 123, at 433.
130. MCLEAN, supra note 20, at 47.
131. CONSOLATION, Book IV Poem 6, supra note 116, at 140.
132. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 27. This poem has been praised as one of Bryant's
best-written, whose message is crystal clear: "The God who guides the waterfowl in its migra-
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determination is exercised. By his choice of this poem, he seems to synthesize
not only his views on the utility of the language of nature as instructive, but the
ideal of a greater force (whether denominated "Thunderer" or "God" or simply
"nature") that embodies love and order for those with the ability to discern it. For
Weinreb, the search for such discernment is the critical thing; we simply must
"achieve what we aspire to achieve, nor give over the aspiration," regardless of
our ultimately mastery of understanding. 33
Or, as Bryant wrote in Castles in the Air, there is
The realm of Castles in the Air. The foot
Of man hath never trod those shining streets;
But there his spirit, leaving the dull load
Of bodily organs, wanders with delight
And builds its structures of the impalpable mist . . .
VI. CONCLUSION
Bryant looked to his own country, both politically, culturally and in terms
of natural surroundings, to craft his poetry. 3 ' That environment was alive to the
varying and deep currents of natural law. To the extent that natural law still
embodied reference to nature itself and notions of a great "clockwork," or back-
ground normative order, Bryant was a part of that culture. We know that he stud-
ied Coke and that he practiced actively in courts at a time when judges and law-
yers still paid homage to natural law. His significant poetry, much of it written
during his period as a law student and lawyer, reflects a normative natural order
within which self-determination is recognized as a lofty element of concepts of
freedom, equality and liberty. As such, Bryant's poetry provides a key to
Weinreb's argument for ontological natural law and, conversely, an understanding
of the intellectual framework of an ontological natural law as set forth by Weinreb
provides an insight into the poetry of the lawyer/poet Bryant. Nothing more
should be asked from such a confluence of law and literature.
tory flight, keeping it safe from the hunter, will similarly guide us through life to a final
refuge." HYATT H. WAGGONER, AMERICAN POETS FROM THE PURITANS TO THE PRESENT
41(1968).
133. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 265.
134. POETICAL WORKS, supra note 8, at 383.
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